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RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS
Robert D. Sloane†
4. IS CURTISS-WRIGHT’S CHARACTERIZATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER
CORRECT?
THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF CURTISS-WRIGHT–
BASED THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE POWER
I.
The editors of the Journal of the National Security Forum invited a
contribution on the (doubtlessly deliberately) broad question of
whether the characterization of executive power in United States v.
1
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. is correct. In a purely descriptive sense, I
think the answer is clear. As I have said elsewhere, whatever its
merits, Curtiss-Wright’s robust vision of executive power “accurately
reflects the general preeminence of the President in the realm of
2
U.S. foreign affairs.” Whether it should, however, is of course a
distinct question, the analysis of which begins with Curtiss-Wright’s
more general thesis about the origin, nature, and scope of U.S.
foreign relations power. At the outset, it may therefore be worth
†
Visiting Associate Professor, John Harvey Gregory Lecturer in World
Organization, Harvard Law School; Associate Professor, Boston University School
of Law. The title of this piece has been adapted, of course, from Laurence H.
Tribe’s well-known article entitled The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980)—for similar reasons. To paraphrase
Tribe’s concluding inquiry about the persistence of process-based theories of
constitutional interpretation, it might, with equal force, be asked about CurtissWright-based theories of executive power: What does “it say about our situation . . .
that views so deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful a grip upon our
thought?” Id. at 1080. I acknowledge with gratitude the research assistance of
Lindsay Schare.
1. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
2. Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An
Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341, 349 (2008); see also Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth
of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 382 & n.11
(2000) (“It is clear, at least as a practical matter, that the President does play a
leading role in foreign affairs, and has done so since the founding.”).
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emphasizing that, with very few exceptions, legal scholars from
across the ideological spectrum agree that Curtiss-Wright’s broad
and general thesis about the source of U.S. foreign relations
power—as expressed, among other places, in Curtiss-Wright—is
misguided, to say the least. Indeed, with the exception of the case’s
3
formal holding, virtually every aspect of Curtiss-Wright—from its
history to its constitutional methodology to its political theory—has
4
been subjected to withering criticism. There is little that I can or
would add in this regard.
Yet in the aftermath of what many commentators see as
unprecedented and exorbitant assertions of executive power by the
5
Bush administration, it may be worthwhile to revisit Curtiss-Wright’s
vision of the President in an effort to better understand both its
message and why it continues to exert an influence out of
6
proportion to its legal merits, as numerous critics have attested.
Perhaps, that is, the puzzle for national security law today is why
“views so deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful a grip
7
upon our thought.” After exploring the pedigree of Curtiss-Wright,
and canvassing some of the major criticisms directed at it, I will
conclude by venturing a few reflections on why the opinion’s vision
of executive power persists—both in the law and the popular
imagination—despite its considerable flaws.
3. Even the strongest advocates of the nondelegation doctrine agree that the
joint resolution of Congress empowering the President to criminalize the sale of
arms to states involved in the Chaco War did not violate that doctrine. See CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 329; see, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation
Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and its
Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 345–51 (2001)
(defending Curtiss-Wright’s holding despite unequivocally rejecting its extraconstitutional textualist rationale). I thank Gary Lawson for this reference.
4. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The
Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 195,
231 (Curtis A. Bradley & Christopher H. Schroeder eds., 2009) (“[N]o one
embraces Sutherland’s cherished theory about the twofold nature of federal power
and the opinion probably doesn’t make sense without the theory.”).
5. See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 134–59 (2007);
FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 153 (2007).
6. Cf. Powell, supra note 4, at 231 (concluding that the real question CurtissWright poses today is “to what extent do the Constitution’s arrangements of
institutional responsibility place foreign relations in the president’s sphere?”).
7. Tribe, supra note †, at 1080.
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II.
The origin of Curtiss-Wright’s general thesis about the source,
nature, and scope of U.S. foreign affairs powers dates to George
8
Sutherland’s early political career in Congress, and perhaps even
further, to the pedagogical influence of Judge James V. Campbell,
one of Sutherland’s teachers at the University of Michigan Law
School, which he attended nearly sixty years before penning Curtiss9
Wright. In 1909, Sutherland, who then served as Utah’s junior
Senator, wrote The Internal and External Powers of the National
10
In it, he sought to resolve a constitutional puzzle,
Government.
which, at least for those who reject Sutherland’s solution, persists to
this day, namely, that in the realm of “foreign relations . . . the
Constitution seems a strange, laconic document: although it
explicitly lodges important foreign affairs powers in one branch or
another of the federal government, and explicitly denies important
foreign affairs powers to the states, many powers of government are
11
not mentioned.”
For Sutherland, however, the Constitution’s apparent lacunae
in this regard reflected a “failure to distinguish between our internal
12
and our external relations.”
The Constitution, he argued,
implicitly distinguishes internal from external sovereignty, as well
13
as their commensurate powers. Within the internal realm, the
Constitution textually enumerates the powers of the federal
government so as to distribute internal sovereign powers between
14
the union and the states, which, by virtue of the Tenth
8. On Sutherland’s career in Congress, see generally JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL,
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 36–100 (1951).
9. Id. at 226. See also id. at 227–28 (quoting Campbell’s views and
concluding that “it was [he] who planted in Sutherland’s brain the ideas that bore
fruit in the Curtiss-Wright case”).
10. George Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the National
Government, 191 N. AM. REV. 373 (1909).
11. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13–
14 (2d ed. 1996). See also id. at 14 (supplying examples of unenumerated foreign
affairs powers).
12. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 373–74 (emphasis in original).
13. See id. at 379–80 (“The powers of government must be commensurate with
the objects of government, else only a semi-government has been created.”).
14. Sutherland contended that “as the powers of the general government are
diminished those of the several State governments are extended. Such powers are
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Amendment, retain any residual powers that the Constitution does
15
not delegate to the federal government.
In the external or
foreign realm, however, as Louis Henkin aptly described the
breathtaking centerpiece of Sutherland’s view, it turns out that “the
powers of the United States to conduct relations with other nations
16
do not derive from the Constitution!”
Rather, the powers of
17
“national sovereignty inhere[] in the United States,” as a corollary
of its independence as a sovereign State, quite apart from the
18
Constitution’s text or subtext. The sovereign powers of the Union
19
in relation to other States derive not from the Constitution, but
20
from the “law of nations,” the old appellation for international
law, or perhaps from what Joseph Story called “resulting powers—
resulting from the whole mass of the power of government, and
from the nature of political society, rather than as a consequence of
21
any especially enumerated.”
A quarter of a century before Curtiss-Wright, therefore, and well
before his appointment to the Court, Sutherland had formulated
the basic thesis that supplies not the rationale, but the backdrop to
its conceptually distinct thesis about executive power. This critical
distinction is often overlooked in the literature. In his 1909 article,
generally regarded as the earliest written expression of Curtiss-

not lost, they are only distributed.” Id. at 375.
15. Id. at 379–80.
16. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 16. Nor is the emphasis hyperbolic. Justice
Sutherland writes in pertinent part, “It results that the investment of the federal
government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution.” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
17. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 376.
18. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
19. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the several states of the union with
the lower case and capitalize “State” to refer to nation-states, that is, foreign
sovereign countries.
20. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 382 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 385 (
“The earlier cases upheld the right of exclusion under the ‘accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe’” (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.,
142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892))).
21. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 383 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1256 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S.
Hein & Co. 5th ed. 1994) (1891)).
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22

Wright’s theory of foreign affairs power, Sutherland in fact took no
position whatsoever on either (i) the distribution of foreign
relations powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches or (ii) the comparative competence of the branches of
the federal government in the realm of foreign affairs. And it is
proposition (ii), not (i), that supplies the only real rationale found
in Curtiss-Wright for allocating to the executive branch the
overwhelming majority of unenumerated sovereign foreign affairs
powers, which the union purportedly has solely by virtue of
international law and statehood, quite independently of the
Constitution.
In its earliest incarnation, Sutherland’s Curtiss-Wright thesis is
limited to advancing this view of the extra-constitutional origin,
nature, and scope of U.S. foreign affairs power generally. To that
end, he emphatically insists upon the exclusively national character
23
of such powers. But he does not insist, as he later does, on their
exclusively executive character (except as expressly set forth in the
Constitution’s text). In short, the 1909 article speaks to vertical
federalism (between the states and the union) but says nothing
about horizontal federalism (between the federal executive,
legislative, and judicial branches). Nowhere does it even imply
presidential preeminence in foreign affairs. At one point, in fact,
Sutherland quotes with apparent approval James Wilson’s remark
that “[w]henever an object occurs, to the direction of which no
particular state is competent, the management of it must, of
24
necessity, belong to the United States in Congress assembled.”
22. With the exception, that is, of the writings of Judge James V. Campbell,
Sutherland’s teacher at the University of Michigan Law School, whose words
influenced the justice more than a half a century before he wrote Curtiss-Wright.
See PASCHAL, supra note 8, at 226–28.
23. See, e.g., Sutherland, supra note 10, at 389 (“Over external matters . . . no
residuary powers do or can exist in the several States, and from the necessity of the
case all necessary authority must be found in the National government, such
authority being expressly conferred or implied from one or more of the express
powers, or from all of them combined, or resulting from the very fact of
nationality as inherently inseparable therefrom.”). This goes a long way toward
explaining Sutherland’s consistent support for robust federal power abroad but
conservative stance in relation to the scope of federal power at home in the
context of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal and interpretation of
the Interstate Commerce Clause in cases like A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–47 (1935). See Powell, supra note 4, at 217–19.
24. Sutherland, supra note 10, at 377 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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About a decade later, Sutherland delivered the prestigious
Blumenthal Lectures at Columbia Law School and published a
manuscript based on them in which he largely expanded on his
25
earlier article. Once again, nothing in the manuscript argues for
either a constitutional imperative or practical need for executive
preeminence in U.S. foreign affairs. Quite the contrary, in
Constitutional Power and World Affairs, Sutherland goes to great
lengths to emphasize, for example, the limits of the Commanderin-Chief Clause, which, he writes, confers “simply those [powers]
which belong to any Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of a
nation at war. The Constitution confers no war powers upon the President
26
as such.” He also admonishes his readers to be wary in general of
the threat of executive aggrandizement that the U.S. Constitution
enables and indeed facilitates, especially in wartime.
Given the striking contrast between his views in 1918, as
expressed in Constitutional Power and World Affairs, and the sweeping
executive-power rhetoric in Curtiss-Wright nearly two decades later,
one further illustrative passage bears quoting at length:
The office of the President has grown in potency and
influence to an extent never dreamed of by those who
framed and adopted the Constitution. Even in normal
times, Congress has been subjected to such a degree of
executive domination as to threaten the stability of the
principle of departmental independence involved in the
distribution of the several powers among the three
branches of government. There is a popular, everincreasing disposition to regard the President as a
superior officer rather than a co-equal member of a
tripartite organization. In times of public danger or
disorder this tendency is greatly accentuated, and it is
under all conditions a matter for serious concern, fraught
with grave suggestions of peril. In great crises, the people
not only turn to him as their natural leader, which he is,
but they are coming more and more to regard him as the
sole repository of their power which, very decidedly, he is
27
not.

25. See Powell, supra note 4, at 218. The manuscript codifying and expanding
upon his revised lectures is GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND
WORLD AFFAIRS (1918).
26. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, at 73 (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 75.
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It is difficult to believe that this is the same man who would
later refer to “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations,” and then recite a litany of examples and
rationales in an effort to establish the need for executive
28
preeminence, and often exclusivity, in the realm of foreign affairs.
For as Powell rightly observes, “by the standards of early twenty-first
century debates, [in Constitutional Power and World Affairs,]
Sutherland stated a distinctly pro-Congress view of the line between
legislative and executive power with respect to involving the United
29
States in armed conflict.”
III.
Curtiss-Wright gave Justice Sutherland the opportunity to shape
U.S. law directly and, as the years since testify, durably in a way that
30
few other Supreme Court justices have enjoyed.
The opinion
31
itself has been analyzed and critiqued repeatedly, and so I need
not dwell on its details at much length. On May 28, 1934, in the
32
midst of the Chaco War, Congress empowered the President to
criminalize the sale of arms to the belligerents, Paraguay and
Bolivia, provided he first (i) “finds that the prohibition . . . may
contribute to the reestablishment of peace”; (ii) consults with
28. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(emphasis added). See also Powell, supra note 4, at 222 (“At the heart of
Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-Wright is an account of the constitutional order
reoriented from his 1919 defense of the foreign affairs authority of the national
government (and Congress in particular) against federalism and narrowconstruction attack to an assertion of the foreign affairs authority of the president
that stresses its independence of Congress.”).
29. Powell, supra note 4, at 220; cf. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
30. Cf. PASCHAL, supra note 8, at 226 (“Sutherland’s success in winning the
Court to his view of the foreign relations power was a personal triumph of
proportions seldom encountered in judicial biography.”).
31. For a full account of Curtiss-Wright’s background and context, see Powell,
supra note 4.
32. Bolivia and Paraguay fought the Gran Chaco War between 1932 and 1935.
It has been largely forgotten today; it should not be. As Powell points out, it “is
sometimes thought of as a Western Hemisphere reprise of the First World War,”
and in its weaponry, sheer scale of destruction, and tactics, the Chaco War
“foreshadowed the Second World War.” Powell, supra note 4, at 198. The League
of Nations’ failure to prevent or control the Chaco War also “presaged the failures
shortly to come over the Spanish Civil War, and Italian, Japanese, and German
Militarism.” Id.
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“other American Republics”; and (iii) “makes proclamation to that
33
effect.” President Franklin Delano Roosevelt did so on the same
34
day. The government subsequently indicted the defendants for
35
violating the prohibition, and as relevant here, the latter argued
in defense that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its
36
power to the President.
To the almost certain surprise of both parties, Justice
Sutherland began by indicating that the Court would not decide
what was, for the administration and its lawyers, the most
fundamental issue lurking in the case: “[w]hether, if the Joint
Resolution had related solely to internal affairs, it would be open to
the challenge that it constituted an unlawful delegation of
37
legislative power to the Executive.” Instead, he framed the issue
in terms of the paramount theme of his extrajudicial writings,
namely, the alleged asymmetry between federal power in the
internal and external realms: “assuming . . . that the challenged
delegation, if it were confined to internal affairs, would be invalid,
may it nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive
aim is to afford a remedy for a hurtful condition within foreign
38
territory?”
Sutherland then set out, in abbreviated form, the theory of
U.S. foreign affairs powers he had first expressed in 1909. He
began by explaining that the “broad statement” that ours is a
federal government of enumerated powers “is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs,” for in that sphere, the
Constitution “carve[d] from the general mass of legislative powers
then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable to
39
vest in the federal government.”
But the states, Sutherland
continued, never possessed external powers, that is, foreign
relations powers in the first place; rather they operated, he wrote,
as “a unit in foreign affairs, acting through a common agency—

33. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 312 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
34. Id. at 311.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 314.
37. Powell, supra note 4, at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted); see CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 315.
38. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315.
39. Id. at 315–16 (emphasis added).
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40

namely, the Continental Congress.” Consequently, foreign affairs
powers passed directly from Great Britain “to the colonies in their
41
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.”
What follows is the first of the two core conclusions for which
Curtiss-Wright is (in)famous: that the Constitution “did not declare
or enumerate” the powers of the federal government in the realm
42
of foreign affairs but instead “assumed them.” Powers that may
fairly be characterized as external do not depend on their
enumeration vel non in the Constitution’s text; they “vest[] in the
43
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”
Consequently, foreign affairs powers as basic as those related to, for
example, war, treaties, diplomatic relations, territorial acquisition,
and immigration exist by virtue of their direct transfer from the
44
Crown, not because of any textual delegation. By this logic,
Sutherland justified “a well-nigh limitless power for the federal
government in the field of foreign relations—a power, it may be
45
repeated, existing independently of the Constitution.”
46
As vulnerable to criticism as this logic may be, it is vital to
40. Id. at 316.
41. Id.
42. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 17; see Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 (“It results
that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.”).
Henkin suggests that although Sutherland did not explicitly describe foreign
affairs powers as “extra-constitutional,” that is the best reading of his history.
HENKIN, supra note 11, at 18 n.*. I agree. Further support for this view may be
found, for example, in Sutherland’s earliest article, in which he explicitly describes
the power to acquire territory by discovery, occupation, cession, and conquest,
which the Supreme Court had affirmed, see, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S.
202, 212 (1890), as “extra-constitutional” but denies that it is for that reason “unconstitutional.” Sutherland, supra note 10, at 384.
43. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
44. See id.
45. PASCHAL, supra note 8, at 223.
46. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 2, at 381 (“There was no theory of
extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs at the time the Constitution was
drafted and ratified. To the contrary, the Constitution’s drafters and ratifiers
understood the Constitution as the means to give the national government foreign
relations power it would otherwise lack.”). Sutherland’s thesis is also in
considerable tension with Supreme Court cases stating that the “Congress and the
President, like the courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution.”
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6
(1957) (“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution.”) (footnotes omitted); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (insisting that President Truman’s
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appreciate that the allegedly extratextual nature of foreign affairs
powers is only the first—and not even a necessary—step in CurtissWright’s argument in favor of robust, often exclusive, executive
power. That the federal government rather than the states
possesses the union’s foreign relations powers says nothing about
how the Constitution—or sovereignty, which has now been cast as
the real source of U.S. foreign affairs powers, including many that
47
the Constitution does not enumerate—allocates those powers.
The genesis and persistence of Curtiss-Wright’s theory of executive
power therefore depend as much, if not more, on the second core
conclusion for which the opinion is often cited: that it is the
President, not Congress or (less controversially) the judiciary, that
possesses the vast majority of the unenumerated foreign affairs
powers posited by Sutherland.
IV.
Why, after all, should this be? The answer cannot depend, as
the first step does, on the meaning of sovereignty, or indeed, on
48
anything in the law of nations. International law—even today, but
certainly in 1936—does not require states internally to allocate
49
foreign affairs powers in any particular way. Nor can the answer
be historical. While the Framers’ experience with the Articles of
Confederation led them to establish an executive office, “the
Framers were hardly ready to replace the representative
challenged power to seize the steel mills must be found in either the Constitution
or a statute).
47. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 22. As Henkin rightly observes, except as to
those foreign relations powers expressly allocated to one branch or another, or
reasonably inferable from other allocations, “we are not told how the
undifferentiated bundle of federal powers inherent in sovereignty is distributed
among the federal branches.” Id.
48. Today, some argue that international law confers upon peoples a right to
democratic governance. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation
in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539, 541 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 47 (1992); see generally
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R.
Roth eds., 2000).
49. See Michael Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v.
Barreme or Curtiss-Wright, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5, 13 (1988) (“That a nation enjoys
certain prerogatives under international law logically says nothing about which
branches of its government, under its domestic law, are accorded power to
exercise them.”).
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inefficiency of the many with an efficient monarchy.”
The
Constitution assigns most of its enumerated foreign affairs powers
51
to Congress, while those “explicitly vested in [the President] are . .
52
. fewer and more modest,” unless, of course, one accepts the
unitary executive thesis that the Vesting Clause itself “is a grant in
53
bulk of all conceivable executive power,” including any foreign
54
relations powers not explicitly assigned to Congress.
But Curtiss-Wright does not suggest that Justice Sutherland
subscribed to this thesis. If he had, it is difficult to see why he felt
the need to locate foreign relations powers in a source extrinsic to
the Constitution’s text. The real gravamen of Curtiss-Wright’s
theory of a robust chief executive is a functional or pragmatic
argument about the comparative competence and institutional
suitability of the President in contradistinction to Congress. The
President, unlike Congress, has at his disposal, inter alia,
“confidential sources of information,” “agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials,” and the ability to act with
the confidentiality, discretion, dispatch, and flexibility required in
55
foreign relations.
The combination of Curtiss-Wright’s first
premise (the federal government’s unenumerated powers in the
realm of foreign relations) with its second (the executive’s
institutional advantages and suitability to exercise such powers)
gives rise to a vision of the Presidency that surely would have
astonished the Framers, for “it exists despite the contrary intentions

50. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 27.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (vesting in Congress the powers, among others, to
provide for the common defense, regulate foreign commerce, define and punish
offenses against the law of nations, declare war, grant letters of marque and
reprisal, make rules concerning captures, raise and support the army and navy,
make rules for the governance of the military forces, and repel invasions).
52. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 31 (footnote omitted).
53. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 640–41 (“If that be true, it is difficult to see
why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some trifling
ones.”). But see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 29–34 (2006).
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. For a general exposition and defense of the
unitary executive thesis, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). But see Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1994).
55. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–21
(1936).
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56

of the Philadelphia Convention.”

V.
Yet Curtiss-Wright apparently excited little comment in the legal
community of the era. This is, at once, understandable and
surprising. It is understandable because Sutherland’s thesis in
Curtiss-Wright built on a number of nineteenth-century
57
precedents, and his “nationalistic view” of the scope of the federal
58
government’s foreign affairs powers “was hardly novel.”
Furthermore, in the midst of the Great Depression and the years
leading up to World War II, constitutional argument tended to
focus on the scope of the President’s internal powers and the
constitutionality of certain programs forming part of the New
59
Deal.
It is nonetheless surprising that the sweeping vision of
executive power sketched out in Curtiss-Wright prompted no serious
debate at the time, and the first major law review article to examine
60
the decision did not appear until a decade later.
Since then, it is fair to say that Sutherland’s general thesis has
been thoroughly debunked. Legal scholars and historians alike
61
have eviscerated his account of constitutional history. And while
Henkin is surely correct that Sutherland’s theory need not depend
on the accuracy of his history, as he goes on to remark, “Other
62
criticisms . . . are not as readily avoided.”
In particular, most
scholars doubt that the Framers thought the new federal
government of the United States would possess major powers not
63
set forth in the text of the Constitution. From the standpoint of
political theory, “it was the heyday of Lockian philosophy,” which
56. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 67 (1991).
57. See Sarah Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (1999).
58. Powell, supra note 4, at 219.
59. See id. at 225–26.
60. See id. at 227 (referencing David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An
Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946)).
61. See, e.g., Walter LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An
Interpretation, 74 J. AM. HIST. 695 (1987); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations
Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles
A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.: An Historical Reassessment, 83
YALE L.J. 1 (1973); Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An
Historical Study, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1907).
62. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 19.
63. See id. at 19–20.
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held “that the people were sovereign and that all authority
64
stemmed from them.”
The opinion fares equally poorly as a
65
matter of constitutional theory, which for the most part is at any
66
rate “the sheerest of dicta.”
Also, Sutherland’s apparent conception of sovereignty, while
colorful, obscures its complexity. In Curtiss-Wright, he wrote:
“Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government
change; but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure
without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in
67
suspense.”
Neither the meaning nor the accuracy of this
conception of sovereignty is self-evident. In the first place, at times,
sovereignty is held in suspense. That would be one way to describe,
for example, Somalia’s sovereignty since the ouster of Mohamed
Siad Barre two decades ago. Where is the supreme will in Somalia
today? While that example may be anachronistic relative to CurtissWright’s era, one need not search far to find more
contemporaneous ones. Two years before Curtiss-Wright, the
United States entered into a treaty with Cuba by which it locked
into perpetuity its 1903 lease agreement rights to exercise
“complete jurisdiction and control over” a portion of Guantanamo
Bay, even though Cuba would retain what the parties denominated
68
“ultimate sovereignty.” The point of emphasis is that the meaning
of sovereignty varies, and it does not always require a Hobbesian
supreme will. Sovereignty, like property, is better analogized to a
64. Levitan, supra note 61, at 480; cf. Glennon, supra note 49, at 13
(expounding the history of constitutionalism in general as “in no small part the
history of the domestic control and allocation of sovereign prerogatives”).
65. See generally, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 2.
66. Glennon, supra note 49, at 12.
Legal scholars differ on the
characterization of Curtiss-Wright as dicta. Compare, e.g., KOH, supra note 4, at 94
(“Sutherland’s key language was dicta, for Congress had passed a joint resolution .
. . that expressly authorized the president to take the action under challenge.”),
and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring), with Lofgren, supra note 61, at 32 (“In sum, it is incorrect
to dismiss major segments of Curtiss-Wright as dicta.”). In fact, it seems accurate to
say that parts of the opinion—namely, those needlessly describing the alleged
plenary powers of the President and comparative advantages of the executive
institution—should be characterized as dicta, while others should not be—for
example, the necessary premise (at least, at the time) that the nondelegation
doctrine operates less stringently in the realm of foreign affairs.
67. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316–17
(1936).
68. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
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bundle of rights and competences, which can (and should) be
disaggregated and need not be transferred or exercised by a single
69
institution.
Furthermore, even the opinion’s functional or pragmatic
arguments about the comparative advantages of the executive
should be tempered. Does the average state governor ascending to
the Presidency obviously have a better command of diplomacy and
foreign affairs than a senior, long-term member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, for example? And while it is
doubtless true that the Presidency has both inherent institutional
advantages and effective control over the vast majority of the
massive U.S. apparatus for diplomacy, intelligence, negotiation,
and so forth, mere control of these instruments does not invariably
translate into better policy. In the context of the conflict formerly
known as the global War on Terror, for instance, some scholars
argue that President Bush’s refusal to consult or coordinate policy
with Congress led to serious and avoidable errors in U.S. national
security policy, as well as a patchwork framework for detention,
interrogation, trial, and other aspects of the long-term conflict that
70
is widely regarded as illegitimate by large sectors of the public. In
terms of both legitimacy and efficiency, then, what Harold Hongju
Koh has called the “balanced institutional participation” theory of
71
national security implicit in Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown,
in contrast to Curtiss-Wright’s vision, may well produce
demonstrably better results, although it bears stressing here that a
results-oriented theory of constitutional interpretation itself would
require a substantive defense.
Finally, even if the executive is institutionally better suited for
most of the foreign affairs functions of the federal government—
and that is, more often than not, accurate—it does not follow that
he enjoys all related constitutional powers. The Constitution
deliberately sacrifices some efficiency in the interest of securing
72
liberty. As Justice Brandeis wrote:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by
69.
70.

LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8–10 (1995).
See generally BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:
LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007).
71. KOH, supra note 4, at 105.
72. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose
was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, to save the people from
73
autocracy.
VI.
These critiques only begin to scratch the surface of the full
case that can be advanced against Sutherland’s views in CurtissWright, both as to the pedigree, nature, and scope of U.S. foreign
affairs powers and as to their predominant if not exclusive
allocation to the President. Yet the Supreme Court continues to
cite Curtiss-Wright as authority for a variety of diverse propositions.
To take one recent and prominent example, in Boumediene v. Bush,
the Court cited Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that in evaluating
“both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose
detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be
74
accorded to the political branches.” The executive branch, less
75
surprisingly, likewise relies on Curtiss-Wright in diverse contexts.
The sheer diversity of legal circumstances in which Curtiss-Wright
arguably supplies a precedent may begin to explain why “views so
deeply problematic continue to exert so powerful a grip upon our
76
thought[.]” But beyond its utility to the executive branch, the
persistence of Curtiss-Wright—and, indeed, one might say, its
institutionalization as part of the layman’s constitutional
mythology—may be ascribed to at least three factors.
73. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008); see also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S.
349, 351 (2005) (citing Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that the President is the
“sole organ” of the United States in foreign affairs).
75. See, e.g., Brief for United States, Flores-Villar v. United States, 130 S.Ct.
2428 (2010) (No. 09-5801), 2010 WL 3392008 at *17–18 (citing Curtiss-Wright for
the proposition that sovereignty confers upon the political branches judicially
unreviewable power to exclude aliens and to confer or deny citizenship);
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations
Act to Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, 2009 WL 2810454, *7 (O.L.C.) (2009)
(“The President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation . . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)
(citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319)) .
76. Tribe, supra note †, at 1080.

2011]

TEN QUESTIONS: SLOANE

5087

The first is the historical pattern of executive initiative,
congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance that Koh
77
identified two decades ago. It is not difficult to see that same
pattern at work in the decade since the attacks of 9/11. Second,
and related, crisis tends to create a public atmosphere that enables
and often encourages the accretion of executive power, while the
return to normalcy is seldom accompanied by the surrender of
those executive powers acquired or exercised during crisis. Indeed,
it is surely one of the enduring ironies of Curtiss-Wright that its
author, two decades before, had warned readers against the very
vision of executive power found in the opinion. In Constitutional
Power and World Affairs, Sutherland called attention to the “popular,
ever-increasing disposition to regard the President as a superior
officer rather than a co-equal member of a tripartite organization”
and also observed that “[i]n times of public danger or disorder this
tendency is greatly accentuated . . . . In great crises, the people not
only turn to him as their natural leader, which he is, but they are
coming more and more to regard him as the sole repository of
78
their power which, very decidedly, he is not.”
Third, as Henkin implicitly suggests in his renowned treatise
on foreign relations law, it may be that Curtiss-Wright persists
because of the absence of another explanation for the
Constitution’s notoriously opaque and laconic nature in the realm
of foreign affairs. Any effort to confer on Curtiss-Wright the status
79
its critics suggest it merits—perhaps that of Lochner v. New York —
will therefore require an alternative understanding of how the
Constitution confers and allocates the federal government’s
foreign affairs powers. Koh’s vision of balanced institutional
participation, in my judgment, offers one compelling alternative.
Yet in the final analysis, reliance on Curtiss-Wright as a
precedent for executive power does not depend on the merits of
the opinion’s broader claims about the source and nature of U.S.
foreign affairs powers. Perhaps the paramount reason for its
persistence is that critics tend to focus predominantly—and often
exclusively—on this latter claim, leaving the former, namely, about
the alleged comparatively greater competence of the executive
branch relative to the other branches in the realm of foreign
77.
78.
79.

KOH, supra note 4, 117–49.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 26, at 75.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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affairs, apparently untouched. As I have briefly suggested, however,
it is not obvious, a priori, that the executive branch is (invariably)
institutionally better suited for—or (always) enjoys inherently
greater competence than—its coordinate branches vis-à-vis each
and every aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Equally, even assuming that
experience demonstrates, a posteriori, that the executive branch
enjoys greater comparative competence in some area of foreign
affairs, it does not logically or uncontroversially follow, as a matter
of constitutional theory, that the President “therefore” enjoys all
relevant powers in that area. Both of the foregoing propositions
must be established, by argument and evidence, not simply
80
assumed or asserted dogmatically.
For it is on the strength of
such argument and evidence that Curtiss-Wright’s vision of executive
power ultimately stands or falls.

80. For an article evincing the sort of scrutiny of these claims that I have in
mind, see, for example, Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the
Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (2011).

